Al-Burhan Revives Saudi-Sudan Maritime Deal Amid Legitimacy Questions

The current rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and the de facto authorities ruling Sudan appears to extend beyond the circumstances and shifting dynamics of the ongoing war, in which Riyadh has sought to support the army led by General Abdel Fattah al Burhan. It appears to encompass far more sensitive issues.

According to documented reports, the matter concerns the redrawing of the maritime boundary between the two countries, a move that has raised serious concerns among observers.

The maritime border file between Saudi Arabia and Sudan has remained unresolved for nearly half a century. The last significant developments date back to 1974, making the decision to reopen the issue amid Sudan’s current crisis particularly questionable.

Sudan has been engulfed in a devastating war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces since 15 April 2023, resulting in what the United Nations has described as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. All efforts and initiatives to bring the conflict to an end have so far failed.

What Happened?


On 14 September 2026, a Sudanese committee established under Resolution No. 266 of 2026 met under the chairmanship of Al Burhan, as part of arrangements related to the financial and investment affairs of the Supreme Council for Cooperation and Strategic Coordination between Sudan and Saudi Arabia, according to documented reports.

The meeting resulted in measures that went beyond administrative arrangements. The Sudan Sea Ports Corporation was designated as the federal body responsible for coordination between civilian and military institutions, while the executive secretariat was granted direct access to historical documents and maps relating to the Red Sea and the maritime boundaries.

It was also decided to establish a technical committee comprising the National Boundaries Commission and the Sudanese Naval Forces to review maps and legal documents and develop a technical framework for demarcating the maritime boundary. In addition, national maritime monitoring and surveillance centres are to be developed in coordination with the ports of Jeddah and Yanbu.

These measures do not mean that a final agreement is ready for signature. They do, however, indicate that the issue has moved into a phase of preparing the technical and legal groundwork that could precede negotiations over the maritime boundary lines or their formal confirmation.

The move has sparked considerable controversy, particularly given the exceptional circumstances Sudan is currently facing. The war remains ongoing, there is no elected parliament, and the authorities currently based in Port Sudan lack an electoral mandate.

In this context, the United States, through its State Department, has stressed that neither the Sudanese Armed Forces nor the Rapid Support Forces, nor their respective leaders, constitute a legitimate constitutional government of Sudan.

Borders to Be Traded, Not Drawn


According to observers, the army commander’s current actions are part of a broader process in which an authority that governs by force of arms rather than through the ballot box is negotiating over sovereign resources and rights that could remain in force for decades to come, thereby exceeding the limits of its transitional authority.

Sudan’s 2019 Constitutional Document stipulated that international agreements are to be ratified by an elected legislative council, rather than by two wartime institutions that have assumed control of the state by force.

On the other hand, the provisions stating that “the powers of the legislative council, until its formation, shall be exercised by the Sovereignty Council and the Council of Ministers” may amount to little more than a fragile legal cover, drafted in an entirely different political context and now being used to push through an irreversible decision on behalf of those who may not, in the first place, possess the legitimate authority to sign it.

A Partner That Knows Exactly What It Is Doing


From the perspective of the current situation, Riyadh can hardly be viewed as an innocent party in this picture. Saudi Arabia is fully aware of the fragility and lack of legitimacy of the party with which it is negotiating. Yet it has chosen, of its own accord, to deal with a divided wartime authority rather than wait for legitimate Sudanese institutions to be restored.

Negotiating with a weak counterpart that faces no meaningful public accountability is, after all, an easier and potentially more advantageous arrangement.
The decision to market the initiative under the banner of “managing investment opportunities in the maritime boundaries” appears to reveal the substance of the underlying motivation: this is not simply about borders and sovereignty, but about resources and economic concessions being extracted from an exhausted state at its most vulnerable moment.

The 1974 agreement remained unresolved for decades because the demarcation of the exclusive economic zone is an exceptionally sensitive matter. Now, suddenly, the process appears to be accelerating in the midst of war and internal armed conflict, a timing that can hardly be regarded as either neutral or innocuous.

If this course of action is indeed taking place, it raises serious questions about why an authority incapable of providing security for its own citizens, and unable even to exercise control over the entirety of Sudanese territory, would seek to sign a permanent border agreement that could bind generations of Sudanese yet to come, without their consultation or consent.
Riyadh, too, will inevitably face difficult questions, particularly over why it would agree to sign such an agreement with an authority of this nature, unless it stands to benefit from the absence of the oversight and accountability that would ordinarily be provided by an elected institution.

What is being prepared behind closed doors today is not merely a line on a map. It concerns the pledging of Sudan’s maritime resources and economic future through the signature of an authority that represents no one but itself.

So long as this process continues without the maps and documents being disclosed to the Sudanese public and without independent oversight, responsibility for any relinquishment of Sudan’s maritime rights will rest equally with those who sign the agreement in Port Sudan and those who agree to sign it in Riyadh.

By ethionegari@gmail.com

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