By Kebour Ghenna
History has a sense of humor, and it usually laughs last.
Ethiopia, a country that once borrowed confidently in a world drowning in cheap money, now finds itself negotiating with creditors who insist that rules are rules, except when they aren’t.
The problem, we’re told, is technical. A quarrel over “comparability of treatment.” A disagreement about who should lose how much money, and in what order.
But that’s never really the problem, is it?
The real issue is that Ethiopia has wandered into the modern financial system, a place where debts are sacred, growth is assumed, and time is supposed to heal all balance sheets. When growth fails to arrive on schedule, creditors become theologians overnight, invoking doctrines, frameworks, and committees as if they were laws of physics.
They are not.
They are conventions. And conventions break, especially when foreign exchange dries up.
Ethiopia defaulted on its $1 billion Eurobond in 2023 because it could not earn enough hard currency to pay it. That fact has not changed. What has changed is that creditors now argue over how politely Ethiopia should acknowledge this reality.
Bondholders, having bought risk knowingly, are shocked! Shocked, to discover that risk has materialized. They threaten lawsuits, not because lawsuits will restore Ethiopia’s export capacity, but because lawsuits are what financiers do when arithmetic turns against them.
Courts, after all, are cheaper than factories.
Official creditors, France and China, play the role of stern adults in the room. They insist that private investors should not be treated “too well.” This sounds principled. It is also self-interested.
Governments don’t like setting precedents that might someday be used against them.
The IMF hovers nearby like a well-meaning but anxious chaperone. It wants discipline. It wants reform. Most of all, it wants to believe that if enough spreadsheets are aligned, the birr will stabilize and confidence will return.
Confidence, alas, is not something you can restructure.
Foreign exchange is the real constraint here, not legal language. Ethiopia does not lack clever financial engineers; it lacks dollars. Export-linked bonds, IMF programmes, creditor committees, all of them rearrange claims on future income that may or may not arrive.
This is why negotiations drag on. Everyone senses, quietly, that there is no elegant solution. There is only delay, redistribution of losses, and the hope that time, always the debtor’s ally, will soften today’s certainties.
Can France and China support Ethiopia “until the end”? Of course they can. The end is flexible. Support, in this context, does not mean generosity; it means postponement. As long as Ethiopia plays by the ritual, talks, reforms, promises, support will continue. Not because it works, but because abandoning the process would admit that the global debt system itself is rigid.
Is Ethiopia’s policy smart?
That depends on what you mean by smart.
If “smart” means obeying IMF guidelines, managing optics, and keeping creditors talking rather than suing, then yes, very smart. If “smart” means escaping the structural trap of borrowing hard currency to finance growth that earns soft currency, then no. That trap has not been escaped by any amount of diplomacy.
In the end, Ethiopia’s debt story is not unique. It is the same story told from Argentina to Zambia: too much faith in growth, too much trust in capital markets, and too little respect for the limits imposed by real resources.
The markets will eventually calm down. They always do, right before the next surprise. And Ethiopia will still be there, producing coffee, managing scarcity, and discovering that sovereignty, like solvency, is a matter of degree.
The lesson, if anyone were inclined to learn it, is simple: Debts that cannot be paid will not be paid.
They will only be renegotiated, slowly, ceremonially, and with great indignation from those who believed money was risk-free.
Editor’s note: – views in the article reflect the views of the writer only!!